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								 	ABSTRACT		This	thesis	evaluates	the	effects	of	a	monetary	policy	shock	in	the	Eurozone.	The	investigation	stems	from	the	recent	implementation	of	negative	interest	rates	in	select	European	countries	and	Japan.	Impulse	response	functions	are	used	to	compare	variable	responses	when	not	influenced	by	negative	rates	versus	 when	 significantly	 impacted	 by	 this	 monetary	 policy.	 The	inconclusiveness	 in	 the	comparison	between	these	two	models	resulted	 in	failing	 to	 reject	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 negative	 interest	 rates	 have	 yet	 to	 be	successful	 in	 the	 Eurozone.	 However,	 any	 economy	 is	 a	 complicated	environment	that	cannot	be	modelled	precisely,	as	numerous	other	factors	play	 a	 role	 in	 the	movements	of	macroeconomic	variables.	Therefore,	 this	research	is	simply	one	possible	perspective	regarding	this	monetary	policy.	
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	 3	Introduction	This	thesis	was	written	to	explore	an	unusual	aspect	of	the	modern	economic	environment	–	negative	interest	 rates.	 Formerly	 considered	 by	 economists	 as	 an	 impossible	 move,	 it	 is	 now	 critical	 to	understand	 the	 thought	 process	 of	 each	 central	 bank	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 crossing	 the	 zero-lower	bound.	Thus	far,	the	most	common	course	of	action	has	been	to	solely	implement	a	negative	repo	rate,	with	no	direct	influence	to	consumers.	With	key	targets	in	mind,	such	as	2%	inflation,	do	we	expect	negative	rates	to	remain	a	reality	in	the	long-run?	Furthermore,	perhaps	more	surprising	has	been	the	implementation	of	negative	mortgage	rates.	Consumers	in	countries	such	as	Denmark	have	been	receiving	a	positive	interest	amount	on	their	loans.	Despite	the	events	of	2008,	we	are	again	observing	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 housing	 bubble	 in	 multiple	 European	 countries	 due	 to	 declining	borrowing	 costs.	 Negative	 side	 effects	 have	 plagued	 the	 region,	 which	 creates	 further	 doubt	regarding	this	monetary	policy.			This	paper	analyzes	the	effects	of	a	monetary	policy	shock	in	the	context	of	negative	interest	rates.	From	 comparing	 the	 impulse	 response	 functions	 of	 two	 structural	 vector	 auto-regressions,	 it	 is	evident	that	this	monetary	policy	has	yet	to	support	the	Eurozone	economy	to	its	desired	economic	health.	 Most	 importantly,	 this	 thesis	 strives	 to	 evaluate	 the	 success	 of	 this	 monetary	 policy	 and	anticipate	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)’s	future	policy	decisions.	
I.	Literature	Overview	Negative	interest	rates	are	still	quite	a	novel	concept	to	the	global	economy.	Though	there	is	plenty	of	literature	regarding	general	monetary	policies	and	interest	rates,	few	authors	have	written	about	negative	interest	rates	specifically,	simply	because	we	are	still	experiencing	and	observing	its	effects.	The	motivation	of	this	thesis	was	drawn	from	both	formal	and	informal	text,	but	the	primary	paper	used	as	a	guide	 is	 “Nominal	Rigidities	and	 the	Dynamic	Effects	of	a	Shock	 to	Monetary	Policy”	by	
		 4	Lawrence	J.	Christiano,	Martin	Eichenbaum,	and	Charles	L.	Evans	(abbreviated	from	here	on	as	CEE).	This	paper	evaluates	the	effects	of	an	expansionary	monetary	policy	shock	in	the	United	States	from	1965	to	1995	using	significant	indicators	of	interest	rates	and	a	vector	auto-regression.	The	analysis	in	sections	VI	to	IX	will	be	building	on	the	CEE	model	in	terms	of	region	and	time	frame	in	order	to	prove	the	hypothesis	that	negative	interest	rates	have	not	yet	been	successful	as	a	monetary	policy	in	
the	 Eurozone.	 The	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 largely	 inspired	 by	 the	 many	 detrimental	consequences	that	have	resulted	from	negative	rates.	Answering	this	statement	will	provide	insight	into	how	long	we	can	expect	negative	rates	to	remain	in	the	Eurozone,	what	other	effects	to	expect	in	the	short	and	long-run,	and	whether	or	not	policymakers	made	the	right	decision.	All	of	these	ideas	will	be	addressed	in	the	sections	below.		A	 lot	 of	 informal	 literature,	 such	 as	 news	 articles,	 have	 addressed	 the	 concerns	 and	 progress	 of	negative	 rates	 thus	 far.	 Though	 solely	 theoretical,	 these	 sources,	 a	 few	 of	which	 can	 be	 found	 in	Appendix	 IV,	provide	great	background	regarding	 the	 issue	at	hand.	For	example,	Levring	(2016)	speaks	to	side	effects	seen	in	the	Danish	housing	market,	where	apartment	prices	rose	15.6%	within	a	 year.	 Negative	 interest	 rates	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 borrowing,	 and	 consumers	 are	 responding	 by	investing	 a	 dangerous	 aggregate	 amount	 in	 real	 estate.	 Policymakers	 believed	 that	 increased	spending	would	revive	 the	European	economy,	but	did	not	necessarily	anticipate	 the	undesirable	effects	that	are	now	arising.	Nevertheless,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	ECB’s	monetary	policy	 is	multifaceted.	 For	 instance,	 from	 the	 content	 of	 Praet	 (2017),	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 asset	purchase	programme	(APP)	also	plays	a	critical	role	in	the	Eurozone’s	monetary	policy.	This	text	also	reveals	many	of	the	side	effects	from	negative	rates	and	the	APP.	The	ECB	is	constantly	releasing	new	information	regarding	their	monetary	policies,	and	with	such	a	current	topic,	there	will	undoubtedly	be	effects	on	this	thesis’	research.	Potential	ramifications	are	further	discussed	in	section	X.		
		 5	Furthermore,	 a	 few	existing	papers	 address	 relevant	material	 to	 this	 thesis.	Bech	and	Malkhozov	(2016)	 focus	on	 the	 technical	 implementation	of	negative	 rates.	For	example,	many	banks	had	 to	configure	their	operational	systems	to	accept	a	negative	policy	rate.	Arteta	et	al.	(2016)	carry	out	a	more	in-depth	investigation	into	the	immediate	and	longer-term	impacts	of	this	monetary	policy.	The	paper	 uses	 limited	 data,	 but	 concludes	 that	 there	 are	 no	 significant	 changes	 to	 inflation	 rate	expectations.	This	result	is	interesting	as	policymakers	expected	negative	rates	to	induce	noticeable	changes	in	key	indicators	such	as	the	inflation	rate.	Feldstein	(2012)	speaks	to	the	underlying	reasons	behind	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 European	 economy	 and	 the	 primary	 reasons	 policymakers	 turned	 to	negative	 rates.	 This	 publication’s	 content	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 as	 we	 segue	 into	 the	 next	section,	which	discusses	indicators	of	interest	rates	and	prefaces	this	paper’s	analysis	by	identifying	the	variables	that	will	be	used	in	the	empirical	model.		 	 	
II.	Indicators	of	Interest	Rates	It	is	crucial	to	begin	our	analysis	with	the	discussion	of	economic	indicators	that	impact	interest	rates.	Many	of	the	factors	mentioned	in	this	section	will	later	be	converted	into	variables	in	our	regression.			Inflation	is	defined	by	the	ECB	as	the	broad	increase	in	the	prices	of	goods	and	services	(European	Central	Bank,	2016).	It	is	measured	by	the	annual	percent	change	in	consumer	prices,	measured	with	the	Producer	Price	Index	(PPI)	or,	more	commonly	in	Europe,	the	Harmonized	Index	of	Consumer	Prices	(HICP).	The	HICP	is	a	weighted	price	 index	of	a	certain	basket	of	representative	goods	and	services,	such	as	transportation,	health	services,	and	food,	harmonized	across	all	member	states	of	the	European	Union.	 Inflation	is	the	percentage	change	in	this	price	 index.	Oftentimes,	 inflation	is	utilized	to	relate	nominal	and	real	interest	rates	through	the	Fisher	Relation:	𝑅 ≈ 𝑟 + 𝑖	
		 6	where	𝑅	 is	the	nominal	interest	rate,	𝑟	 is	the	real	interest	rate,	and	𝑖	 is	 inflation.1	This	is	a	critical	relationship	that	lenders	use,	stating	that	unless	the	lending	rate	is	above	the	inflation	rate,	the	lender	will	not	profit	 from	the	 loan.	From	this	connection,	we	can	see	 that	 inflation	 is	a	key	 indicator	of	interest	rate.		Several	factors	have	a	strong	correlation	with	a	region’s	inflation	rate.	For	example,	unemployment	is	defined	as	the	percentage	of	a	population	who	have	no	job,	but	are	in	the	labour	force	(available	to	work	 and	 actively	 seeking	 employment)	 (Bureau	 of	 Labour	 Statistics,	 2015).	 With	 lower	unemployment,	consumer	confidence	improves,	and	workers	strive	for	higher	wages.	If	firms	have	to	 increase	 their	 wages,	 then	 the	 prices	 of	 their	 goods	 or	 services	 will	 increase.	 Alternatively,	increased	wages	encourage	a	higher	demand	for	commodities,	and	thus	higher	inflation.	Ordinarily,	this	 correlation	would	 be	maintained,	 but	 there	 have	 also	 been	 instances	 of	 stagflation	 in	 recent	history,	such	as	in	the	1970s,	when	inflation	and	unemployment	were	both	elevated.		Real	 gross	domestic	product	 (RGDP)	 is	 one	of	 the	most	popular	ways	 to	 evaluate	 an	economy.	A	region’s	 output	 directly	 reflects	 its	 health	 because	 it	 demonstrates	 its	 ability	 to	 produce.	 Its	respective	components	allow	for	specific	industry	assessment	and	guide	monetary	policies	to	benefit	struggling	sectors	of	a	country	or	region.	Specifically,	RGDP	growth	indicates	the	possibility	of	a	few	scenarios	 –	 increased	 productivity,	 higher	 prices,	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 two.	 Regardless	 of	 the	situation,	it	is	almost	certain	that	inflation	will	ensue	in	the	short-run.		Another	indicator	of	inflation	rate	trends	is	commodity	prices.	These	respond	rapidly	to	an	increase	in	consumer	demand.	For	example,	oil	prices	were	on	the	decline	 for	a	 large	portion	of	2014	and	2015,	 and	only	 recently	 displayed	 signs	 of	 recovery,	 as	 shown	below	 in	 Figure	1.	 Inflation	 levels																																									 																					1	See	Appendix	I	for	the	derivation	of	the	Fisher	Relation.	
		 7	followed	suit,	immediately	dipping	with	signs	of	faltering	investor	confidence	in	the	oil	sector.	People	are	very	dependent	on	oil	for	transportation	and	energy,	which	is	why	the	industry	is	so	important	to	 global	 economic	 trends.	However,	 commodity	prices	have	been	poor	 stand-alone	 indicators	 of	inflation	since	the	early	1980s,	a	period	during	which	overall	inflation	has	been	relatively	low	and	stable	while	commodity	prices	have	been	more	volatile	and	generally	declining	relative	to	the	overall	price	level.	
Figure	1:	U.S.	Crude	Oil	Prices	versus	Inflation							An	economic	environment	such	as	that	of	the	Eurozone	is	extremely	complex,	with	many	variables	simultaneously	responding	to	each	other.	By	analyzing	the	critical	indicators	of	interest	rates,	we	are	pinpointing	the	most	important	variables.	Section	VI	will	talk	about	the	data	used	in	further	detail.	
III.	Global	Economic	Environment	In	2008,	the	world	experienced	its	biggest	financial	crisis	since	the	Great	Depression.	Also	known	as	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis,	this	recession	was	caused	by	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble,	causing	major	 firms	 such	 as	 Lehman	 Brothers	 Holding	 Inc.	 and	 Bear	 Stearns	 Companies	 Inc.	 to	 declare	bankruptcy.	For	18	months,	 the	American	economy	contracted,	consequently	affecting	economies	around	 the	world.	 Economic	 activity	 in	 the	 G7	 countries	 dropped	 by	more	 than	 5%.	 Canada,	 for	example,	was	not	in	the	spotlight	of	this	global	recession,	but	suffered	big	setbacks	in	exports	and	investments.	Europe	spiraled	into	a	debt	crisis.	
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The	European	Sovereign	Debt	Crisis	stemmed	from	an	underlying	problem	–	the	fact	that	19	member	states	of	the	Eurozone	shared	the	same	currency.	This	meant	that	any	monetary	policy	initiated	by	the	ECB	applied	to	every	country,	despite	differing	economic	health	across	the	region.	In	early	2010,	markets	recognized	the	error	of	regarding	all	Eurozone	countries	as	equally	safe	(Feldstein,	2012).	Though	a	Eurozone	member’s	debt	was	not	to	exceed	3%	of	GDP,	certain	countries	such	as	Greece	and	 Spain	 had	 mounting	 sovereign	 debts,	 upon	 which	 higher	 interest	 rates	 were	 instated.	 For	example,	the	average	Greek	had	public	debt	of	$39,000.	Insolvency	fears	regarding	Greece	resulted	in	a	partial	default.	Many	discussions	ensued	regarding	the	disbanding	of	the	Eurozone,	which	would	have	allowed	Greece	to	pursue	a	devaluation	and	default	strategy.		With	an	extremely	weak	global	economic	environment	and	dipping	interest	rates,	countries	began	to	look	at	negative	rates	as	a	serious	possibility.	Recovery	efforts	with	standard	monetary	policies	were	unsuccessful.	The	figure	below	illustrates	interest	rates	of	select	G7	countries	since	2001.	The	Group	of	7	(G7)	comprises	of	Canada,	United	States,	Germany,	France,	Italy,	Great	Britain,	and	Japan.	Formed	in	1975,	the	group	meets	annually	to	discuss	economic,	global,	and	energy	issues.	It	is	apparent	that	rates	never	recovered	after	the	recession.		
Figure	2:	Global	Interest	Rates	from	2001	to	2016							
		 9	Further	evidence	of	a	weak	global	economy	is	shown	below	in	Table	1.	United	States’	inflation	rate	dropped	from	2%	to	0.25%	in	the	 last	quarter	of	2008,	and	the	unemployment	rate	 jumped	from	5.8%	to	9.3%	from	2008	to	2009.		
Table	1:	Selected	U.S.	Statistics	during	the	Subprime	Mortgage	Crisis	Year	 U.S.	Unemployment	Rate	 	 Quarter	 U.S.	Interest	Rate	2010	 9.61%	 	 2008	Q4	 0.25%	2009	 9.28%	 	 2008	Q3	 2%	2008	 5.80%	 	 2008	Q2	 2%	2007	 4.62%	 	 2008	Q1	 2.25%		As	standard	monetary	policies	failed	to	spur	economies	across	the	world,	a	few	countries	opted	for	an	unconventional	route	–	 implementing	negative	 interest	rates.	 In	Eurozone	countries,	 there	 is	a	small	 peak	 in	 CPI	 at	 the	 onset	 of	 2015,	 which	 was	 one	 of	 the	 desired	 effects	 of	 negative	 rates.	However,	inflation	rates	only	reached	target	rate	of	2%	last	month,	prompting	many	critics	to	remark	that	negative	rates	have	been	unsuccessful.	One	of	these	people	is	David	Hoffman,	IMF	(International	Monetary	 Fund)	mission	 chief,	 who	 is	 concerned	 about	 Denmark’s	 sky-rocketing	 housing	 prices.	Growth	in	the	housing	market	is	a	common	effect	of	negative	rates,	as	borrowing	costs	lower	and	consumers	are	putting	more	money	into	properties.	Even	as	economic	recovery	has	remained	weak,	apartment	prices	have	grown	50%	since	their	low	point	in	2009	(Levring,	2016).		
IV.	Negative	Interest	Rates	Conventionally,	one	would	receive	interest	for	deposited	money.	Negative	interest	rates	reverse	this	notion,	 because	 one	 would	 pay	 a	 specified	 rate	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 money	 in	 the	 bank.	 This	unconventional	monetary	policy	is	an	act	of	desperation	to	assist	economic	recovery.	For	now,	only	the	repurchase	agreement	(repo)	rate	has	entered	negative	territory,	rather	than	the	deposit	rate	for	consumers.	The	repo	rate	is	the	rate	at	which	the	central	bank	lends	to	commercial	banks	in	any	given	country,	a	process	used	to	replenish	the	reserves	of	banks.	This	section	will	discuss	the	theoretical	
		 10	effects	 of	 negative	 interest	 rates.	 However,	 real-life	 economies	 with	 negative	 rates	 have	 not	necessarily	exhibited	the	same	behaviour	as	predicted	in	theory.			Banks	Instead	of	keeping	money	with	the	central	bank,	negative	interest	rates	encourage	banks	to	hold	their	cash.	However,	an	even	better	option	for	banks	is	to	purchase	alternative	assets,	or	lend	out	money	to	smaller	firms	and	consumers.	Hence,	borrowing	costs	fall	in	such	a	scenario.	If	banks	choose	to	absorb	the	costs	of	maintaining	deposits,	their	profits	would	be	significantly	impacted.	Narrowing	their	net	interest	margins	may	be	preferred	over	reducing	deposit	rates	or	increasing	the	charge	to	run	current	accounts,	especially	if	it	was	believed	that	the	negative	rate	was	only	going	to	exist	in	the	short-run.		Consumers	Depending	on	expectations	of	the	duration	of	a	negative	bank	rate,	commercial	banks	may	or	may	not	decide	to	lower	the	deposit	rate.	Consumers	will	only	be	directly	affected	if	the	banks	decide	not	to	absorb	the	costs	of	negative	rates.	Upon	the	implementation	of	a	negative	deposit	rate,	consumers	would	likely	prefer	to	keep	cash	under	their	mattresses	at	home	instead	of	paying	the	bank	to	keep	their	money,	which	poses	an	increased	security	risk.	Nonetheless,	consumers	will	likely	experience	lower	interest	rates,	increasing	their	consumption	and	investment.		 	Economy	As	alluded	to	above,	depending	on	expectations	of	the	duration	of	a	negative	bank	rate,	commercial	banks	may	or	may	not	decide	 to	 lower	 the	deposit	 rate.	The	purpose	of	negative	 rates	 is	 to	 fight	deflation,	which,	at	unhealthy	levels,	causes	economic	slowdown.	If	demand	for	goods	and	services	increases,	inflation	should	theoretically	rise	as	well.		
		 11	V.	The	European	Central	Bank	The	ECB	is	the	central	bank	for	the	Euro	Area,	also	known	as	EA-19.	This	zone	consists	of	19	member	states,	all	of	whom	have	adopted	the	Euro	as	their	main	currency.	The	ECB	was	the	second	bank	in	the	world	to	implement	negative	interest	rates	after	Danmarks	Nationalbank.	According	to	the	ECB’s	website,	their	current	monetary	policy	strategy	is	to	maintain	inflation	rate	at	just	under	2%.	As	of	2016	Q4,	the	rate	was	still	below	1%2,	but	reached	2%	in	February	of	2017.	Such	developments	are	important	to	note	as	we	consider	the	lifespan	of	negative	interest	rates.	It	is	impossible	to	pinpoint	the	stimulus	that	caused	inflation	to	increase,	and	thus	we	cannot	give	all	the	credit	to	negative	rates.	
VI.	Data	The	variables	in	the	data	set3	have	been	adapted	from	CEE’s	paper,	which	explores	the	reactions	of	the	American	 economy	 to	 a	monetary	 policy	 shock.	 All	 the	 variables	 are	 values	 representing	 the	Eurozone,	or	EA-19	region.	In	addition,	all	series	have	been	transformed	to	growth	rates,	with	the	exception	of	int.	The	series	that	appear	in	the	empirical	model	are	shown	below.	It	is	important	to	note	a	few	differences	from	the	variables	included	in	CEE’s	model.	First	of	all,	M1	has	been	replaced	with	M3.	Both	are	money	aggregates,	though	M1	represents	the	more	liquid	side	of	money	supply.	M3	is	a	much	more	common	measure	in	the	Eurozone.	Furthermore,	profits	have	not	been	included	in	this	model	as	such	data	was	unavailable	on	official	Eurozone	data	resources.	CEE	also	state	that	real	profits	had	little	response	to	a	monetary	policy	shock.		
Table	2:	Variable	and	Series	Names	Variable	Name	 Series	Name	
intrate	 Interest	Rate	
hicp	 HICP	
rgdp	 Real	GDP	
gdpdef	 GDP	Deflator																																									 																					2	European	Central	Bank	Statistical	Data	Warehouse,	Series	ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR	“HICP	–	Overall	Index”	3	Available	upon	request.	
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cons	 Consumption	
inv	 Investment	
prod	 Labour	Productivity	
M3	 M3	Money	Aggregate		The	data	is	split	into	two	series.	Y1	contains	rgdp,	gdpdef,	cons,	inv,	hicp,	and	prod,	while	Y2	consists	of	money	supply.	The	distinction	is	made	with	the	acknowledgment	that	the	variables	in	Y1	are	not	contemporaneously	correlated	with	the	central	bank	rate.			𝑌( = 𝑌*(, 𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑌.( 								(1)	When	we	think	about	correlation	between	two	variables,	it	is	important	to	consider	whether	or	not	contemporaneous	responses	would	occur.	In	the	case	of	the	Y1	variables,	it	is	impossible	that	they	would	move	at	the	same	time	as	interest	rate.	Economic	factors	take	time	to	respond	to	each	other,	and	thus	Y1	has	lagged	responses	to	Yt.	On	the	other	hand,	money	supply	is	immediately	affected	by	movements	in	the	interest	rate.	Y2	is	contemporaneously	correlated	with	Yt.	
VII.	Empirical	Model	The	methods	used	 to	 test	 the	 impact	of	 interest	 rates	entering	negative	 territory	are	a	 structural	vector	auto-regression	(SVAR)	and	its	subsequent	set	of	impulse	response	functions	(IRF).	The	SVAR	measures	the	correlation	of	each	variable	and	four	lags	with	short-run	constraints,	which	we	have	already	explained	above	 in	 the	data.	Though	the	CEE	paper	addresses	 its	model	as	a	vector	auto-regression	(VAR),	its	inclusion	of	contemporaneous	values	and	short-run	constraints	points	to	the	more	appropriate	SVAR	model.	The	number	of	lags	was	also	directly	drawn	from	CEE,	but	a	varsoc	command	was	also	run	in	Stata	to	confirm	the	optimal	number.	The	IRF	then	shocks	the	interest	rate	to	reveal	the	results	for	each	variable,	shown	in	section	VIII.	The	SVAR	equation	is	as	follows:		 𝑌( = 𝐴*𝑌(3* + 𝐴.𝑌(3. + 𝐴4𝑌(34 + 𝐴5𝑌(35 + 𝐶𝜂(						(2)		
		 13	The	 short-run	 constraints	 on	 this	 model	 are	 the	 8	×	8	 matrices	 below.	 These	 are	 Cholesky	constraints,	 which	 allow	 us	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 percentage	 change	 in	 each	 variable	 is	 not	contemporaneously	 affected	by	 changes	 in	 any	of	 the	 variables	 that	 appear	 after	 it.	C	 is	 a	 lower-triangular	matrix	with	the	diagonal	terms	equal	to	1,	and	𝜂(	is	a	diagonal	variance-covariance	matrix.	For	 example,	 a	 percentage	 change	 in	 real	 GDP	 does	 not	 have	 contemporaneous	 correlation	with	consumption.	A	percentage	change	in	consumption	would	be	affected	by	a	change	in	real	GDP	but	not	investment.			
𝐶 =
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0. . . 1 0 0 0 0 0. . . . 1 0 0 0 0. . . . . 1 0 0 0. . . . . . 1 0 0. . . . . . . 1 0. . . . . . . . 1
							𝜂( =
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .
	
	Prior	 to	 proceeding	with	 the	model,	 Granger	 Causality	 tests	were	 conducted	 to	 determine	 if	 the	variables	in	Table	2	can	be	used	to	forecast	each	other.	Specifically,	we	are	testing	if	rgdp,	cons,	inv,	
prod,	 hicp,	and	M3	Granger-cause	 intrate.	 A	 p-value	 of	 less	 than	 0.05	 allows	 us	 to	 reject	 the	 null	hypothesis.	Thus,	all	the	variables	below	except	for	rgdp	and	cons	Granger-cause	intrate.	However,	causal	relationships	are	not	definitive	in	the	sense	that	there	are	many	other	factors	that	determine	the	correlation	between	two	variables.	Failing	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	 in	the	cases	of	 intrate-
rgdp	and	intrate-cons	could	be	due	to	a	tertiary	component	not	analyzed	in	the	Wald	tests.	
Table	3:	Wald	Tests	for	Granger	Causality	
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
intrate rgdp 5.873 4 0.209 
intrate gdpdef 10.327 4 0.035 
intrate cons 8.8512 4 0.065 
intrate inv 13.761 4 0.008 
intrate prod 11.233 4 0.024 
intrate hicp 16.851 4 0.002 
intrate M3 10.65 4 0.031 
intrate ALL 96.675 28 0.000 
		 14	VIII.	IRF	Results	Figures	 3	 and	 4	 exhibit	 the	 IRFs	 from	 four	 distinct	 models4.	 Since	 the	 data	 and	 regressions	 are	adapted	 from	 CEE’s	 paper,	 Model	 1	 is	 a	 replica	 of	 the	 regression	 described	 in	 part	 II,	 ‘The	Consequences	of	a	Monetary	Policy	Shock’,	with	the	time	range	extended	to	2016	Q3.	Disparity	in	the	IRF	curve	may	also	be	due	to	slight	discrepancies	in	data.	By	replicating	CEE’s	analysis,	it	was	then	a	much	easier	process	to	adapt	the	paper	to	Eurozone	data,	as	shown	in	Model	2.	Each	variable	was	shocked	across	20	periods,	or	quarters,	as	shown	on	the	x-axes,	and	its	percentage	point	responses	are	shown	on	the	y-axes.	The	only	difference	between	the	two	graphs	below	in	Figure	3	is	the	region.	We	can	see	that	real	GDP	responses	did	not	exhibit	drastic	differences	between	the	United	States	and	the	Eurozone.	This	observation	was	also	true	for	the	other	six	variables	tested.	
Figure	3:	IRFs	of	Output	Response	to	Interest	Rate	Movements,	U.S.	versus	Eurozone							The	regression	process	was	then	split	into	two	additional	models:	Model	3,	or	the	first	set	of	graphs	in	grey,	represents	the	results	from	an	SVAR	prior	to	the	recession,	or	2008	Q2.	The	regression	was	then	simulated	with	the	entire	data	set	up	to	2016	Q3.	Model	4	is	intended	to	have	a	large	influence	from	negative	interest	rates,	allowing	us	to	best	evaluate	the	impact	of	this	monetary	policy.	Ideally,	an	 additional	 regression	 would	 be	 run	 for	 the	 time	 period	 with	 solely	 negative	 interest	 rates.	However,	at	a	quarterly	frequency,	there	are	too	few	data	points	at	this	time	to	attain	viable	results.	
																																								 																					4	See	Appendix	II	for	a	visual	summary	of	the	four	models.	
United	States	(Model	1)	 Eurozone	(Model	2)	
		 15	
Figure	4:	Model	3	versus	Model	4	SVAR-based	IRFs			
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		 16																																						IX.	Results	Analysis	In	analyzing	the	graphs	in	Figure	4,	it	is	important	to	note	the	position	and	intervals	of	the	y-axis.	For	example,	in	the	first	set	of	graphs	for	interest	rates,	0,	or	where	the	x-axis	would	be,	is	positioned	much	lower	in	Model	4.	With	this	in	mind,	there	is	no	single	generalization	that	can	be	made	about	
Productivity	
Investment	
Money	Supply	
Legend	
Orthogonalized	IRF	Orthogonalized	IRF	95%	Confidence	Interval	
Model	3	 Model	4	
	 95%	Confidence	Interval	
		 17	the	 relation	 between	 Model	 3	 and	 Model	 4.	 It	 is	 immediately	 evident	 that	 interest	 rates	 react	differently	in	the	two	models,	following	a	consistently	negative	trend	in	Model	4.	Another	observation	that	 can	 be	 made	 is	 that	 the	 addition	 of	 negative	 rates	 in	 the	 data	 creates	 a	 greater	 amount	 of	uncertainty	for	the	future.	The	impulse	response	functions	exhibit	wider	confidence	intervals	in	four	of	the	seven	variables	of	Model	4,	which	generally	imply	that	the	forecasted	values	are	less	precise.	We	also	see	varying	 levels	 in	values	across	the	two	models.	Output’s	behaviour	 is	consistent	with	CEE’s	results,	responding	in	a	hump-shaped	fashion.	Money	supply	also	increases	before	plateauing,	with	 less	 fluctuations	 in	 Model	 4.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 consumption,	 investment,	 and	 labour	productivity	exhibit	more	volatility,	spiking	up	in	the	first	year,	wavering,	and	only	becoming	more	stable	after	15	quarters.	This	unpredictability	indicates	that	in	a	negative	interest	rate	environment,	consumers’	actions	will	not	necessarily	follow	what	is	predicted	in	theory,	as	addressed	in	section	IV.	Finally,	 the	 most	 important	 indicator	 here,	 inflation,	 increases	 immediately,	 and	 does	 end	 up	 at	higher	levels	than	in	Model	3.			Ideally,	this	monetary	policy	would	have	resulted	in	significant	long-term	effects	to	set	off	the	side	effects	of	negative	interest	rates.	Many	of	Model	4’s	results	are	consistent	with	the	expectations	of	negative	interest	rates	and	what	has	already	happened	in	the	Eurozone.	For	example,	low	interest	rates	 should	 inspire	 higher	 levels	 of	 consumption	 and	 investment,	 which	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	immediate	peaks	 in	 their	 respective	Model	4	 IRF	 functions.	Upon	 first	glance,	 it	does	appear	 that	these	 results	 contradict	 the	 original	 hypothesis.	 However,	 this	 analysis	 does	 not	 offer	 conclusive	evidence.	Long-term	consequences	and	other	monetary	policy	initiatives	must	be	considered	as	well.			In	its	most	recent	monetary	policy	announcement,	the	ECB	stated	that	its	central	bank	rate	would	sustain	or	even	decrease	its	central	bank	policy	rate	for	an	extended	period	of	time,	in	addition	to	vamping	up	 the	APP	 (European	Central	Bank,	 2017).	 As	 alluded	 to	 in	 section	 IV,	 if	 the	 repo	 rate	
		 18	remains	 negative,	 commercial	 banks	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 sustain	 the	 profit	 losses	 and	 transfer	 the	negative	 rates	 to	 consumers.	 If	 consumers	 begin	 to	 be	 charged	 for	 keeping	 money	 in	 savings	accounts,	they	will	disengage	from	the	financial	system	and	choose	to	store	their	cash	elsewhere	(El-Erain,	 2016).	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 ECB	 is	 continuing	 aggressive	monetary	 policies	 indicates	 that	 the	central	 bank	 is	 not	 yet	 satisfied	with	 its	 economy’s	 status.	 Kane	 (2016)	 expresses	 concerns	 that	negative	interest	rates	will	have	a	profound	impact	on	consumers,	bank	profits,	and	foreign	exchange	markets.	Negative	rates	were	considered	a	 ‘last	resort’	policy,	so	if	 they	fail,	 the	ECB	has	no	other	stimulus	to	turn	to.		
X.	Considerations	Given	the	results	of	the	SVAR	and	IRFs,	a	few	steps	are	advantageous	to	furthering	this	research.	First,	I	was	unable	to	test	the	time	period	that	exclusively	had	negative	interest	rates,	namely	2014	Q4	–	2016	Q3,	simply	because	there	were	not	enough	periods	to	appropriately	forecast	20	steps	forward.	Such	analysis	would	be	advantageous	 in	a	 few	years.	Secondly,	 I	would	 like	 to	 find	an	alternative	variable	for	profits	used	in	the	CEE	model	to	more	accurately	replicate	their	analysis.	The	ECB	does	not	release	a	specific	net	profits	statistic.	Furthermore,	there	are	many	other	factors	that	constitute	a	nation’s	economic	performance.	With	recent	announcements	showing	that	Eurozone	inflation	has	actually	surpassed	2%	with	the	help	of	bond-buying	programs,	I	would	ideally	like	to	evaluate	the	impact	 of	 programs	 such	 as	 the	 APP.	 When	 coupled	 with	 negative	 interest	 rates,	 how	 do	macroeconomic	variables	respond?	Finally,	this	research	would	be	more	well-rounded	if	all	regions	with	negative	interest	rates	were	analyzed.	It	would	be	worthwhile	to	assess	the	consequences	that	other	places	have	experienced	in	comparison	with	those	of	the	Eurozone.	In	terms	of	the	rest	of	the	world,	it	is	quite	unlikely	that	negative	rates	be	brought	to	North	America	or	the	rest	of	Asia.	Interest	rates	are	already	very	low	worldwide,	and	unless	an	extreme	economic	event	occurs,	such	a	drastic	monetary	policy	is	unlikely	to	be	implemented.	
		 19	XI.	Conclusion	Recall	that	the	hypothesis	for	this	thesis	was	negative	interest	rates	yet	to	be	successful	as	a	monetary	
policy	in	the	Eurozone.	From	the	analysis	above,	it	is	unclear	whether	negative	interest	rates	will	have	a	long-term	effect	on	any	of	the	variables.	When	first	introduced,	this	controversial	monetary	policy	was	expected	to	generate	an	uplifting	force	on	inflation,	consumption,	investment,	and	on	a	whole,	the	 economy.	 Without	 evidence	 to	 support	 otherwise,	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 entire	 Eurozone	economy	 indicates	 that	 negative	 interest	 rates	 have	 yet	 to	 be	 successful.	 The	 IRF	 results	 do	demonstrate	that	some	key	indicators	would	increase,	but	with	no	measurable	long-term	changes,	which	is	the	opposite	of	what	is	needed	in	the	shaky	European	economy.	Page	9	of	CEE’s	paper	states	that	policy	 shocks	only	account	 for	 a	 small	 fraction	of	 inflation.	With	 its	 current	monetary	policy	goals,	the	ECB	needs	to	re-evaluate	its	options.	There	have	been	no	plans	to	revert	interest	rates	to	positive	 values,	 but	 the	 side	 effects	 of	 negative	 interest	 rates,	 such	 as	 soaring	 house	 prices,	overpaying	taxes,	and	increasingly	cashless	societies	seem	to	outweigh	the	benefits.	Thus,	negative	interest	rates	are	not	necessarily	the	best	choice	for	the	European	economy.							 	
		 20	Appendix	I:	Derivation	of	Fisher	Relation	Assume	that		 𝑅	=	nominal	interest	rate		 𝑟	=	real	interest	rate		 𝑖	=	inflation	rate			 𝑃*	=	price	level	today		 𝑃.	=	price	level	tomorrow		In	nominal	terms,		 $1	today	would	be	$(1 + 𝑅)	tomorrow		In	real	terms,		 $*?@	today	would	be	$(*AB)?C 	tomorrow	
1 + 𝑟 = 1 + 𝑅𝑃.1𝑃. 	1 + 𝑟 = 1 + 𝑅1 + 𝑖 	1 + 𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝑖)	1 + 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑖 + 𝑟 + 𝑖 ∙ 𝑟		With	interest	rate	and	inflation	rate	at	small	amounts	such	as	2%,	𝑖 ∙ 𝑟	becomes	very	small.	Thus,			 𝑅 ≈ 𝑖 + 𝑟				
	
	
	 	
		 21	Appendix	II:	Representation	of	Structural	VAR	Models										Appendix	III:	Glossary	Eurozone:	19	of	the	28	states	of	the	European	Union	who	have	adopted	the	Euro	as	their	currency	(thus	also	known	as	Euro	Area-19,	or	EA-19)		HICP	 (Harmonized	 Index	 of	 Consumer	 Products):	 indicator	 of	 inflation	 for	 the	 European	 Central	Bank,	or	the	equivalent	of	CPI	(Consumer	Price	Index)		Inflation	Rate:	sustained	increase	in	the	general	level	of	prices	of	goods	and	services	in	a	region		Repo	Rate	 (formally	known	as	 the	 repurchase	agreement	 rate):	 the	 lending	 rate	between	 central	banks	and	commercial	banks	in	a	region	or	country		Unemployment	Rate:	 the	percentage	of	a	population	who	have	no	 job,	but	are	 in	 the	 labour	 force	(available	to	work	and	actively	seeking	employment)		Zero	Lower	Bound:	 the	economic	environment	 that	occurs	when	 the	central	bank	policy	 rate	has	reached	zero	or	nearly	zero		 	
Model	3	(Eurozone)	
1965Q3 1995Q3 2008Q3 2016Q3
Model	1	(U.S.)	
Model	2	(Eurozone)	Model	4	(Eurozone)	
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